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I. Foreign Investment
A. CONSOLIDATED POLICY ON FOREIGN DIRECT INvESTHIENT
The change in foreign investment policy in India began in 1991 as a measure to counter
the balance of payments crisis and to enhance India's foreign exchange reserves. Estab-
lishing the foreign investment promotion board ("FIPB") to facilitate foreign direct in-
vestment ("FDI") in India, enacting the Foreign Exchange Management Act ("FEMA
1999"), and repealing the former Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 ("FERA"), evi-
denced a fundamental shift in policy. Foreign investment into India was governed by
FEMA 1999, regulations issued under the statute, and clarifications issued by the Depart-
ment of Industrial Policy & Promotion ("DIPP").
1. Policy Changes
To promote FDI through a transparent policy framework, the DIPP published the first
consolidated policy on March 31, 2010 to simplify the regulatory framework for foreign
investment.1 The consolidated FDI policy rescinded all of DIPP's earlier press notes,
press releases, and clarifications in effect as of March 31, 2010. The new policy consoli-
dates and subsumes all press notes, press releases, and clarifications as of March 31, 2010.
In light of the constant evolution of the FDI policy, the first consolidated FDI policy,
issued on March 31, 2010, contained a sunset clause of six months and provided that it
would be superseded by an updated policy issued on September 30, 2010. On that date,
the DIPP issued Circular 2 of 20102 ("Consolidated FDI Policy") which subsumes and
supersedes all earlier press notes and circulars (including the March 31, 2010 Circular)
and reflects the FDI policy as of October 1, 2010. It will be subject to further revision on
March 31, 2011.
* Amarchand & Mangaldas & Suresh A. Shroff & Co. (India).
1. Consolidated FDI Policy, DEP'T OF INDUS. POL'Y & PROMOTION, MINISTRY OF COM. & INDUS. (India),
[ 1.1.9 (Mar. 3, 2010), http://siadipp.nic.in/policy/fdi-circular/fdicircular_1_2010.pdf [hereinafter Consoli-
dated FDI Policy 1].
2. Consolidated FDI Policy, DEP'T OF INDUS. POL'Y & PROMOTION, MINISTRY OF COM. & INDUS. (India),
(Sept. 30, 2010), http://dipp.nic.in/FDI Circular/FDICircular02of2010.pdf [hereinafter Consolidated FDI
Policy 2].
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The Consolidated FDI Policy introduces certain small but significant changes to the
old FDI policy, with far-reaching implications on structuring foreign investment in India.
The high-level issues emanating from a review of the Consolidated FDI Policy and the
key changes to the regulatory framework of FDI policy in India are provided below.
a. Definition of Capital
The Consolidated FDI Policy defines capital to mean equity shares and fully, compul-
sorily, and mandatorily convertible preference shares and debentures. It also clarifies that
although warrants and partly paid shares are not considered capital, they can be issued to
persons residing outside India with the prior approval of the FIPB.3 The Consolidated
FDI Policy further provides that foreign currency convertible bonds and depository re-
ceipts, although not included in the definition of capital, will be treated as FDI.4
b. Pricing of Instruments
The Consolidated FDI Policy provides that "Indian companies can issue equity shares"
and "fully, compulsorily and mandatorily convertible debentures and . . . preference
shares" in accordance with the extant pricing guidelines and valuation norms prescribed
by the Reserve Bank of India ("RBI"). The policy also provides that the price of the
capital instruments (including the conversion price of compulsorily convertible instru-
ments) is to be determined upfront, in accordance with the extant pricing guidelines, at
the time of issuance of the instruments.5
c. Investment by Foreign Institutional Investors
The Consolidated FDI Policy provides that Foreign Institutional Investors ("FII"s) reg-
istered under the Securities and Exchange Board of India ("SEBI") and FII Regulations
1995, can invest both under the FDI route and under the FII route. It stipulates that the
investments made under either route mentioned above will be counted towards the caps
on FII investments, which are specified as a ten percent individual limit and a twenty-four
percent aggregate limit.6 This change in policy may affect existing investments made by
FII entities under the FDI route under the old FDI policy, if the aggregate investments
made by such entities exceed the prescribed limits.
2. Sector-Wide Changes to the FDI Policy
Important sectoral changes under the Consolidated FDI Policy include (1) cigarettes
and (2) cash and carry wholesale trading.
3. Id. 2.1.5.
4. Id. 1 3.2.3.
5. Id.
6. Id. 1 3.1.4.
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a. Cigarettes
Although up to 100% FDI was permitted in the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes
under the old FDI policy, the government had, pursuant to Press Note 2 of 2010,7 prohib-
ited FDI in this sector. Consistent with the provisions of Press Note 2 of 2010, the Con-
solidated FDI Policy provides that companies engaged in the "[m]anufacturing of [c]igars,
cheroots, cigarillos and cigarettes, of tobacco or of tobacco substitutes" are now prohib-
ited from receiving FDI.8
b. Cash and Carry Wholesale Trading
The Consolidated FDI Policy defines cash and carry wholesale trading as the "sale of
goods/merchandise to retailers, industrial, commercial, institutional or other professional
business users or to other wholesalers and related subordinated service providers." 9 It also
provides that wholesale trading would be "sales for the purpose of trade, business and
profession, as opposed to sales for the purpose of personal consumption.... The yardstick
to determine whether the sale is wholesale ... would be the type of customers to whom
the sale is made."10
The Consolidated FDI Policy provides that when undertaking wholesale trading, an
entity (in which there is foreign investment) must comply with at least one of the follow-
ing conditions:
i. The entity must maintain full daily records of sales;
ii. "[Wholesale trading] of goods [is] permitted among companies of the same
group," but "[wholesale trading] to group companies taken together should not
exceed 25% of the total turnover of the wholesale venture;"
iii. "[Wholesale trading] can be undertaken as per normal business practice, includ-
ing extending credit facilities, subject to applicable regulations;"
iv. "A wholesale/cash [and] carry trader cannot open retail shops to sell to the cus-
tomer directly.""
The wholesale trading conditions were incorporated as a measure to check FDI in retail
trading (in which FDI is prohibited), which is allegedly being carried on in the garb of
cash and carry wholesale trading. The change in the regulations is intended to ensure that
foreign retailers do not gain a foothold into the domestic retail market in the garb of
wholesale trading.
The Consolidated FDI Policy also laid down rules for other sectors not covered under
the previous policy, such as head-end in the sky ("ITS")12 and security agencies.'0 The
new Consolidated FDI Policy also clarified its application in relation to certain sectors
such as construction and development projects.14 By consolidating the former FDI re-
7. Press Release, Dep't of Indus. Pol'y & Promotion, Ministry of Com. & Indus. (India), Review of the
Policy on Foreign Direct Investment in the Manufacture of Cigarettes Etc. (May 5, 2010), available at http://
siadipp.nic.in/policy/changes/pn2_2010.pdf.
8. Consolidated FDI Policy, supra note 2, 1 5.1(h).
9. Id. 1 5.2.24.1.
10. Id.
11. Id. 9 5.2.24.1.2(c)-(f.
12. See id. 1 5.2.11.4.1.
13. Id. 9 5.2.21.
14. See id. 1 5.2.13.
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gime, the new Consolidated FDI Policy simplifies the Indian foreign investment regula-
tory framework. It clarifies certain issues (such as foreign investment in warrants or the
definition of real estate), and tightens FDI norms, such as restricting the definition of
"wholesale trading" and permitting FDI into sectors initially excluded from the old FDI
policy.
B. REVISED PRIcING NoRMs
Under the old FDI policy, the price for shares of unlisted Indian companies to a non-
resident could not be less than the price computed by a chartered accountant ("CA") in
accordance with the guidelines issued by the former Controller of Capital Issues ("CCI
Value"). As the CCI Value was based on historical performance parameters, it often
tended to be relatively moderate.
On April 21, 2010, the Government of India amended the Foreign Exchange Manage-
ment (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2000
("FEMA 20") to issue revised pricing guidelines for issue of shares to non-residents.s
Shortly thereafter, the RBI issued a circular dated May 4, 2010 ("May 4 Circular") amend-
ing the guidelines for transfer of shares between residents and non-residents.16 The May
4 Circular provides that the minimum price for transfer of shares from a resident to non-
resident, for listed companies, could not be less than the price computed in accordance
with the SEBI regulations for preferential allotment (such as Chapter VII of the SEBI
(Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements), 2000). For unlisted companies, the mini-
mum price is to be not less than "the fair value determined by a SEBI registered Cate-
gory-I-Merchant Banker or a Chartered Accountant as per the discounted free cash flow
method."17
With the amendment to the FEMA FDI Regulations and the provisions relating to
transfer of shares from residents to non-residents and vice versa, the RBI has set a new
benchmark for calculating price of shares which is based on future performance rather
than historical data. Because the Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") Value would generally
be higher than the CCI Value, the recent amendments would result in higher inflow of
funds to India. But the change presents challenges to private equity valuations in ongoing
deals, as well as closed private equity deals or joint ventures that provide for multiple
investment tranches or other scenarios where a non-resident is to be issued further shares
at a subsequent time. Whether this will work for companies across all sectors (such as
insurance) remains to be seen.
15. See Notification, Foreign Exch. Dep't, Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Exch. Mgmt. (Transfer or Issue
of Security by a Person Resident Outside India) (Amendment) Reg., Annex-I to Circular No. 49/2010,
FEMA 205/2010-RB, (Apr. 21, 2010), http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/N205050510.pdf
(India).
16. See Notification, Foreign Exch. Dep't, Reserve Bank of India, FDI in India-Transfer of Shares/Prefer-
ence Shares/Convertible Debentures by Way of Sale - Revised Pricing Guidelines, Circular No. 49/2010,
RBI/2009-10/445 A.P. (DIR Series), 1 (May 4, 2010), http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/
FDIE05041O.pdf (India).
17. SeeReport ofthe Takeover Regulations Adviory Committee Under the Chairmanship ofMr. C. Achuthan, SEC.
& ExcH. BD. OF INDA, (2010), http://www.sebi.gov.in/conunreport/tracreport.pdf.
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H. Securities Law
A. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE TAKEOVER REGULATIONS
The Takeover Regulations Advisory Committee ("TRAC"), constituted by the SEBI to
review and recommend changes to the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Take-
overs) Regulations, 1997 ("Takeover Regulations"), submitted its report to SEBI on July
19, 2010 ("TRAC Report").' 8 After a review of existing law governing substantial acquisi-
tion of shares and takeovers, the TRAC recommended a comprehensive overhaul of the
existing legal framework.19 The TRAC suggested changes with regard to various aspects
of the Takeover Regulations, including, inter alia, (i) triggers for open offers; (ii) indirect
acquisitions; (iii) offer size; (iv) voluntary open offer; (v) option to delist; (vi) exemptions
from open offer obligations; (vii) offer price; (viii) mode of payment; (ix) competing offers;
and (x) execution of the agreement that triggers open offer. The key changes and implica-
tions of the TRAC recommendations are set out below.
1. Triggers in Relation to Mandatory Offers
a. Voting Rights Triggers
The TRAC has recommended an increase in the acquisition threshold for the initial
trigger of a mandatory open offer from the current level of fifteen percent to twenty-five
percent of the voting capital of a listed company.20 The implications of this recommenda-
tion are that financial investors may acquire up to 24.9% of a listed company without
triggering open offer obligations. Further, promoters holding less than a twenty-five per-
cent stake, who can currently cross the twenty-five percent threshold under the creeping
acquisition route, will attract mandatory open offer obligations at this threshold. But
there may be a cause for concern for promoters with regard to acquirers holding just less
than twenty-five percent because those acquirers could exercise significant voting rights
due to the multiplier effect caused by absenteeism at general meetings.
b. Consolidation Triggers
Shareholders may continue to consolidate their shareholding under the "creeping ac-
quisition" route of five percent per financial year (on a gross basis) between twenty-five
percent and seventy-five percent, through negotiated purchases, preferential allotments,
or on-market transactions.21 The illusory "greater control" threshold of fifty-five percent
has been eliminated. Acquisitions in excess of five percent in a financial year will trigger
an open offer. There is a hard cap on negotiated acquisitions in excess of seventy-five
percent.
18. See id. ch. 1-6 (detailing the proposed takeover regulations).
19. Id. 11 2.8, 3.1,
20. Id. 92.17, 3.2.
21. Id. 13.7, 2(1)(g).
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c. Control Trigger
De facto control as the primary trigger (regardless of shareholding) has been incorpo-
rated into the definition of "control," which is now referenced not just against the "right"
but also the "ability" to control. 22 As a result, the control trigger continues to be an
elusive and subjective determination in each case. Control has, however, been provided an
absolute connotation. "Greater control," as in the case of joint-to-sole control transac-
tions, will not form a separate trigger under the proposed regime (but transfers would
continue to be subject to the voting rights triggers or exemptions, as applicable).23
d. Indirect Acquisitions
The TRAC has recommended that all indirect acquisitions that result in the ability to
exercise voting rights in excess of the voting rights triggers or control over a target com-
pany will trigger a mandatory open offer.24 Further, with a view to prevent direct acquisi-
tions from being disguised as indirect transactions, the TRAC has recommended that
where "the target company is a predominant part of the business or entity being ac-
quired," such indirect acquisition would be treated on par with a direct acquisition for all
purposes under the proposed regulations. 25
The TRAC also set out an objective test for "predominant part of the business," i.e.
where the proportionate net asset value/sales turnover/market capitalization of the under-
lying listed target company represents more than eighty percent of the net asset value/
sales turnover/deal value of the primary acquisition. 26
2. Offer Size
a. Mandatory Offers
All mandatory offers pursuant to the voting rights and control triggers described above
would have to be made for every share in the target company outstanding as of the last day
of the offer (i.e. a 100% offer).27
b. Voluntary Offers
The offer must be made for a minimum of ten percent and is subject to a maximum that
will take the holding of the acquirer and persons acting in concert with it to seventy-five
percent.28
3. Minimum Level of Public Shareholding
a. Offers Pursuant to the Initial/Control Triggers
Shares of the target company would be automatically delisted (i.e. without a separate
delisting offer under the Delisting Regulations) if the post-offer shareholding of the ac-
22. See id. 1 4.
23. Id. IT 5.8, 5.1.
24. Id. 1 5(2).
25. Id. 1 5(2).
26. Id. 1 1.14, 7.1.
27. Id. 1 7(2); see also id. 2.10.
28. Id. 1 1.22, 1.26.
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quirer is more than ninety percent and the acquirer has stated its intention to delist up-
front.29 An acquirer who has not stated his intention to delist or who has a post-offer
shareholding between seventy-five percent and ninety percent would be required to en-
sure compliance with the minimum public shareholding requirement of twenty-five per-
cent by either: (i) proportionately reducing the number of shares acquired in the open
offer and under the triggering agreement;30 or (ii) increasing the level of public sharehold-
ing to up to twenty-five percent within twelve months.31
b. Offers Pursuant to the Consolidation Trigger
Regardless of the post-offer shareholding, an acquirer would not be permitted to delist
the target company pursuant to the open offer. A delisting may only be done under the
SEBI (Delisting of Equity Shares) Regulations 2009 ("Delisting Regulations"). 3 2 In the
event of a post-open offer shareholding in excess of seventy-five percent, the acquirer
must ensure the target company's compliance with the twenty-five percent minimum pub-
lic shareholding requirement.33
4. Offer Price
The current regime permits a tolerance limit of twenty-five percent of the offer price
payable to persons other than the target company (generally the exiting promoters) to-
wards a non-compete fee, without the same being attributed to the open offer price. In
line with its basic objective of ensuring equal treatment for all shareholders, TRAC rec-
ommended deleting this provision. All payments made by the acquirer in relation to the
acquisition of shares would have to be captured in the offer price.34 The commercial
reality and legal basis that differentiates controlling shareholders with knowledge of the
business from other public shareholders has not found favor with the TRAC. This cannot
be in the best interests of the long-term public shareholders of the target company. Some
flexibility for the payment of control premiums could have been permitted.
5. Withdrawal of an Open Offer
In addition to the existing grounds to withdraw an open offer (i.e. non-receipt of statu-
tory approvals and death of sole acquirer), TRAC proposed that an open offer may be
withdrawn where the underlying triggering transaction fails "for reasons outside the rea-
sonable control of the acquirer, and such agreement is rescinded," subject to full disclo-
sure in the open offer documents. 35 Under the current regime, an acquirer may not
withdraw an open offer because of failure of the underlying transaction. The TRAC rec-
29. Id. 91 1.23, 1.28, 7.5.
30. Id. 9 1.23, 1.27, 7.5.
31. See id. 1 7(4); see also id. 1.24 (discussing committee deliberations on delisting).
32. Id.
33. Id. 1 6.5, 23(l)(a)-(c).
34. Notification, Securities Contracts (Regulation) (Amendment) Rules, 2010, Gazette of India, Section
II(3)(i) (une 4, 2010), available at http://www.firinin.nic.in/the ministry/dept eco-affairs/capital market_
div/Amendment SecurtcontractJ957.pdf (India).
35. Discussion Paper on the Requirement ofPublic Holding for Listing, MINISTRY OF FIN. (India), (Feb. 1, 2008),
http://ideas.repec.org/p/ess/wpaper/idl373.htnl (follow "download the selected file" button).
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ommendation internalizes some commercial considerations by requiring the public share-
holders to share some of the risk of filure.
B. MANDATORY TwENTY-FIvE PERCENT PUBLIc FLOAT
The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Rules, 1957 (the "SCRR") have been amended,
with effect from June 4, 2010, to provide for a mandatory public shareholding of at least
twenty-five percent for all listed companies going forward (the "Amendment").36 The
Amendment also sets out requirements for continuous listing and certain transitional pro-
visions for companies with a public shareholding of less than twenty-five percent. The
Amendment is in furtherance of a discussion paper issued by the Ministry of Finance in
2008 that called for imposition of a uniform public float of twenty-five percent at the time
of listing of shares and thereafter on a continuous basis.37
The key features of the Amendment are as follows:
a. The minimum threshold level of public holding will be twenty-five percent for all
listed companies. 38
b. Existing listed companies having less than twenty-five percent public holding have
to reach the minimum twenty-five percent level by an annual addition of not less than
five percent to public holding.39
c. For new listings, if the post-issue capital of the company calculated at offer price is
more than Rs. 4000 crore, the company may be allowed to go public with ten percent
public shareholding and comply with the twenty-five percent public shareholding re-
quirement by increasing its public shareholding by at least five percent per annum.40
d. A company whose draft offer document is pending with SEBI on or before the
Amendment is required to comply with the twenty-five percent public shareholding
requirement by increasing its public shareholding by at least five percent per annum,
irrespective of the amount of post-issue capital of the company calculated at offer
price.41
e. A company may increase its public shareholding by less than five percent in a year if
such increase brings its public shareholding to the level of twenty-five percent in that
year.42
f. The requirement for continuous listing will be the same as the conditions for initial
listing.43
g. Every listed company must maintain public shareholding of at least twenty-five per-
cent. If the "public shareholding in a listed company falls below twenty-five percent at
36. Securities Contracts (Regulation) (Amendment) Rules, supra note 34 2(ii)(a) (amending Rule
19(2)(b)(i) of the SCRR).
37. Id. (amending Rule 19(2)(b)(ii) of the SCRR).
38. Id. (amending Rule 19(2)(b)(ii) of the SCRR).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. 1 2(iii) (inserting Rule 19A(2)).
42. Id.
43. Subhkam Ventures (I) Private Ltd. v. SEBI, (2010) S.A.T. (India), available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/
satorders/subhkamventures.pdf.
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any time, such company shall bring the public shareholding to twenty-five percent
within a maximum period of twelve months from the date of such fall."44
h. The Amendment is intended to provide additional liquidity to public shareholders
and enhance the ability of minority shareholders (i.e. non-promoters) to exercise mean-
ingful rights in publicly listed companies, but will cause a number of publicly listed
companies in India that have a public float varying from ten to twenty-five percent to
increase their public shareholding.
C. KEY JUDGMENTS
The important judgments under the Takeover Regulations and the Companies Act,
1956 ("Companies Act") during 2010 are summarized below.
1. Case Law Under the Takeover Regulations
The Subhkam Ventures case4s changed the regulatory landscape regarding rights associ-
ated with investments into public companies. In that case, private equity investor
Subhkam Ventures challenged a SEBI direction to make an open offer because Subhkam's
acquisition of fifteen percent of MSK Projects, Ltd. gave it the veto right in MSK
Projects, thereby triggering the requirement of making an open offer under Regulation 10
of the Takeover Regulations. Subhkam contended that it was merely a financial investor
and acquisition of a larger stake would not result in a change in the control of the com-
pany under Regulation 12 of the Takeover Regulations. SEBI rejected Subhkam's conten-
tion and ordered it to revise its offer document in accordance with the Takeover
Regulations.
Subhkam appealed to the Securities Appellate Tribunal ("SAT"), which analyzed the
distinction between "positive control" and "negative control" and held that control under
the Takeover Regulations only covered "positive control." The SAT, whilst considering
the specific rights available to the concerned company, ruled that the right to appointment
of a nominee director, standstill provisions, and protective rights given to the company
were not equivalent to possessing or exercising control.46 SEBI has appealed the case to
the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court decision will also have implications for
the SEBI Takeover Regulations.
2. Case Law Under the Companies Act
a. Western Maharashtra Development Corporation Case
In the Western Maharashtra Development Corporation ("WMDC") case,47 the Bombay
High Court held that a "restriction on the transferability of shares in a private [c]ompany
[must] be contrasted with cases involving public [c]ompanies, where the law provides for
free transferability." It also held that "free transferability of shares is the norm in the case
of shares in a public company," and that the provisions under Section 11 1A of the Compa-
44. Id. fi 7-9.
45. W. Maharashtra Dev. Corp. v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., (2010) Bombay H.C., available at http://bombayhigh
court.nic.in/data/judgements/2010/OSARBPl8606.pdf.
46. Id. IjT[ 47, 52.
47. Id. 91 54.
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nies Act are founded on the principles that the public must have the freedom to buy and
shareholders must be free to transfer shares of a public company.48 Regarding the en-
forceability of preemption clauses and their incorporation into the charter documents of a
public company, the Bombay High Court held that a provision contained in the memo-
randum, articles, agreement, or resolution that seeks to impose restrictions on the right of
a shareholder to transfer shares would be void. The court's judgment raises significant
concerns in relation to the enforceability of transfer restrictions on shares of public com-
panies (including pre-emption rights), whether incorporated in the charter documents or
not, as well as the manner in which joint ventures and public M&A transactions are going
to be structured in India.
b. Messer Holdings Case
In the Messer Holdings Limited case, 49 the Bombay High Court ruled on the legality of a
private arrangement involving transfer restrictions between shareholders of a public lim-
ited company. The court considered whether a clause pertaining to a right of first offer is
illegal in light of the principle of free transferability of shares under Section 1I1A of the
Companies Act. The Court held that consensual arrangements entered into between
shareholders that restrict the transferability of shares are valid (if they do not conflict with
the articles of association). But even though such agreements are binding between the
shareholders, they may not be binding on the company. The court also held that it is not
mandatory to incorporate transfer restrictions into the articles of association to make
them enforceable. The court distinguished between transfer restrictions on shareholders
in general and agreements entered into between two identified shareholders (relating to
their respective shareholding), and indicated that the latter need not be incorporated into
the articles of association.
1H. Tax
A. DiREcr TAXES CODE BILL, 2010
The Government of India, manifesting its intention to overhaul the existing tax regime
encapsulated under the Income Tax Act, 1961 ("IT Act"), released the Direct Taxes Code
Bill on August 12, 2009 ("DTC 2009")50 for comments and suggestions. On June 15,
2010, the Ministry of Finance released a revised discussion paper on the draft Direct Tax
Code.5i The revised discussion paper received positive feedback from industry players
because it further simplified existing tax provisions and incorporated key proposals made
by stakeholders.
48. Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, (2010) Bombay H.C., available at http://indian
kanoon.org/doc/464224.
49. Ministry of Finance Revised Discussion Paper on the Direct Taxes Code, CENT. BD. OF DIREcT TAXES
(India), (2010), http://finmin.nic.in/dtcode/RevisedDiscussionPaper.pdf.
50. Direct Taxes Code, SPOTLIGHT (Gov't of India, New Delhi, India) Sept. 2009, http://india.gov.in/spot
light/spotlightarchive.php?id=48; see also Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2009 (Ministry of Finance, India), http://
india.gov.in/allimpfrms/alldocs/12779.pdf (text of the bill).
51. Direct Taxes Code Bill § 1(3).
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The Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010 ("DTC 2010"),52 which was introduced in the Indian
Parliament on August 30, 2010,s3 is proposed to come into force by April 1, 2012.54 The
salient features of the DTC 2010 are set out below.
1. Corporate Tax
DTC 2010 reduces the corporate tax rate to thirty percent for both domestic and for-
eign companies from the current tax rate of 3 3.22% (for domestic companies) and 42.2 3%
(for foreign companies). No further surcharge or education assessment is proposed to be
levied. Further, a foreign company is liable to pay branch profit tax at fifteen percent.55
Other changes were made in the minimum alternate tax, the dividend distribution tax, and
the wealth tax.
2. Capital Gains Tax
DTC 2010 provides for capital gains to be considered as income from ordinary sources
for all taxpayers (including non-residents), which will be taxed at rates applicable to that
taxpayer. The definition of "capital assets" under the IT Act has been replaced with the
term "Investment Asset"56 under DTC 2010. Investment assets do not include business
assets like self-generated assets, the right to manufacture, and any other capital assets con-
nected with business.
DTC 2010 prescribes deduction-based exemptions for equity shares or equity-oriented
mutual funds.57 First, on transfer of equity shares or equity-oriented mutual funds held
for more than one year and where securities transaction tax ("STT") has been paid, a
deduction equal to 100% of the capital gains is applicable. Second, on transfer of equity
shares or equity-oriented mutual funds held for less than one year and where STT has
been paid, a deduction equal to fifty percent of the capital gains is applicable. For other
assets held for more than one year, capital gains are to be computed after allowing an
indexed cost of acquisition or improvement of such asset.
3. International Tax
a. Transfer of Shares/Interest in a Foreign Company
DTC 2010 seeks to expand the deeming provisions under the IT Act by including in-
come arising from transfers outside India (of shares or interests in a foreign company) if
the foreign company holds any assets situated in India, directly or indirectly.58 But these
provisions will apply only if the fair market value of such Indian assets represents at least
fifty percent of the fair market value of all the assets owned by such foreign company
anytime during the twelve months preceding such transfer.s9
52. Direct Taxes Code Bill, 2010, L.S. 110, 15th Lok Sabba (2010).
53. Id. § Ill, second sched. D.
54. Id. § 314 (14 1)(a).
55. Id. § 51.
56. Id. § 5(4)(g).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 4(3)(b).
59. Id. § 314(192).
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b. Residency Test
DTC 2010 provides that a foreign company is treated as a resident in India, if "its place
of effective management"60 is situated in India, which has been defined under DTC 2010
as
(i) the place where the board of directors of the company or its executive directors ...
make their decisions; or (ii) . . . [if] the board of directors routinely approve the
commercial and strategic decisions made by the executive directors or [company of-
ficers], the place where such executive directors or officers of the company perform
their functions. 61
c. Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements (DTAA)
DTC 2010 provides for the applicability of either the DTAA or DTC 2010, depending
on which is more beneficial to the taxpayer except 62 in cases where (i) General Anti-Avoid-
ance Rule ("GAAR") is invoked; (ii) Controlled Foreign Company ("CFC") is invoked; or
(iii) Branch Profits Tax is levied.
d. Transfer Pricing and Advance Pricing Agreements
The transfer pricing provisions contained in DTC 201063 are broadly similar to those
contained in the IT Act. The definition of "Associated Enterprises" has been expanded to
include two more criteria, namely (i) the provision of services by one enterprise to an-
other, either directly or indirectly, and the conditions are influenced by such other enter-
prise, and (ii) "any specific or distinct location of either of the enterprises as may be
prescribed."64
DTC 2010 also introduces advance pricing agreements ("APA"s).6S An APA is an ar-
rangement that determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate set of
criteria (for example, method, comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, and criti-
cal assumptions as to future events) for the determination of the transfer price for those
transactions over a fixed period. It empowers the Central Board of Direct Taxes to deter-
mine the Arm's Length Price ("ALP")66 in relation to such international transactions.
The ALP is subject to safe harbor rules, which is defined to mean circumstances in which
the tax authorities should accept the transfer price as declared by the taxpayer.
Interest, dividends (other than dividends on which dividend distribution tax is paid),
royalties, or fees for technical services would be subjected to a twenty percent withholding
tax. This is, however, subject to relief available under the respective DTAAs.
60. Id. § 291(1), (8)-(9).
61. Id. §§ 116-17.
62. Id. § 118.
63. Id. § 117.
64. Id. § 291.
65. Id. at twentieth sched.
66. Id. § 123.
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4. Controlled Foreign Company
DTC 2010 lists the provisions to compute income attributable to a CFC. It provides
that the total income of a resident taxpayer will include income attributable to a CFC that
has not been distributed by such CFC. DTC 2010 provides that a foreign company that
has a tax rate of less than fifteen percent (i.e. fifty percent of the rate applicable to an
Indian company-i.e. thirty percent) is classified as a CFC. It is also provided that the
CFC regime will apply to a resident that fulfills, individually or collectively, any of the
following criteria in a direct or indirect manner, namely, if the resident (i) holds at least
fifty percent of voting power or capital of the CFC; (ii) has the power to secure application
of fifty percent of income or assets of the CFC for its benefit; (iii) has the ability to "exer-
cise dominant influence on the [CFC] due to [a] special contractual relationship;" or (iv)
exerts "decisive influence in a shareholder meeting." The CFC provisions will not be
triggered if the foreign company is a listed entity, is engaged in active trade or business, or
the specified income does not exceed INR 2.5 million. Additionally, a strict definition of
"active trade or business" has been prescribed, while an underlying foreign tax credit
mechanism has not been provided.
5. General Anti-Avoidance Rule
As per the GAAR provisions,67 the Commissioner of Income Tax can declare an ar-
rangement as impermissible if its main purpose is to obtain a tax benefit and it falls into
any of the following categories: (i) lacks commercial substance; (ii) is not at arm's length;
(iii) represents misuse or abuse of the provisions of the DTC; (iv) is carried out in a
manner not normally employed for bona fide business purposes. The arrangement would
be presumed to be for availing tax benefits, even if the main purpose of a part or a step of
the arrangement is to avail tax benefits, unless the taxpayer demonstrates that availing tax
benefits was not the main objective of the arrangement. The GAAR provisions will apply
as per the guidelines to be framed by the Central Government. Additionally, a Dispute
Resolution Panel will be available in cases where GAAR provisions are invoked. The
GAAR will override provisions of DTAA entered by India with various countries.
B. KEY JUDGMENTS
1. E*Trade Ruling
In E*Trade Mauritius Ltd. v. Director of International Taxation,68 the issue was whether
capital gains tax liability arises in respect to sales of shares of an Indian company by
E*Trade Mauritius Limited ("E*Trade"), a company incorporated in Mauritius, to another
Mauritius company. ETrade was a subsidiary of E*Trade Financial Corporation, a hold-
ing company incorporated in the USA ("E*Trade USA") that had been issued a Tax Resi-
dency Certificate by the Mauritius income tax authorities.
67. Id. 1 65-66.
68. E*Trade Mauritius Ltd. v. Director of International Taxation (Mar. 22, 2010), Authority for Advance
Rulings (Income Tax), ((2010) 230 CTR (AAR) 428)), available at http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/judiciary/
By-virtue-of-Article-13-4-of-India-Mauritius-DTAA-capital-g-1332.asp.
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Relying on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the Azadi Bachao Andolan
case, 69 the Authority for Advance Ruling (AAR) held that where "a resident of a third
country .. . [seeks] to take advantage of the tax reliefs and economic benefits [under any
tax treaty] . . . through a conduit entity, . . . the legal transactions entered into by that
conduit entity cannot be declared invalid."70 The design of tax avoidance by itself is not
objectionable if it is not prohibited by law. The AAR further held that the tax residency
certificate issued by the Mauritius authorities was presumptive evidence of the beneficial
ownership of the shares and the fact that the source of funds for the purchase of shares was
traceable to the holding company (i.e. E*Trade USA) or that the holding company had
played a role in suggesting or negotiating the sale, does not lead to a legal inference that
the holding company in reality owned the shares and/or is the recipient of gains arising
from transfer of shares. The AAR ruled that the capital gains on the sale of shares were
only taxable in Mauritius as per the provisions of the DTAA.
2. Vodafone International Holdings B. V. Case
In this case, 71 Vodafone Netherlands ("Vodafone") acquired a sole share in a Cayman
Islands company ("CGP") for consideration of USD 11.1 billion from Hutchison Interna-
tional, Cayman Islands ("HIL"). CGP controlled sixty-seven percent in Hutchison Essar
Ltd. ("HEL") through intermediary Mauritius & Indian companies/contractual arrange-
ments. The acquisition resulted in Vodafone acquiring control over CGP and its down-
stream entities, including HEL. HEL was a joint venture between Hutchison and Essar
group to provide cellular telephone service in India. Vodafone, subsequent to approval
from the Foreign Investment Promotion Board ("FIPB"), paid the consideration to HIL,
without deducting any tax at source. The Assessing Officer issued notice to Vodafone
contending that because the transaction was taxable in India, Vodafone was obligated to
withhold tax on payment made to HIL. Vodafone contested the same in an appeal before
the Bombay High Court.
The Bombay High Court, rejecting Vodafone's appeal, observed that tax planning is
legitimate so long it is not a colorable device or a sham transaction per Azadi Bachao
Andolan.72 It also ruled that the controlling interest is an incident of ownership of shares
and not a distinct capital asset. The court found that the transaction between HIL and
Vodafone entailed transfer of various rights including indirect interest in HEL, options on
companies holding shares in IEL, appointment of directors in HEL, use and right of
"Hutch" Brand, non-compete agreement with Hutch Group, and preference share capital
of HEL, which is not possible by transfer of merely one share of CGP. The court found
that tax-withholding provisions could apply to a non-resident if there is sufficient territo-
rial connection between the non-resident and India. The court directed the Revenue Au-
thorities to apportion the income that resulted to HIL from the above transaction because
69. Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan and Shiva Kant Jha (2003) 263 ITR 706 (SC).
70. E rade J 9.2.
71. Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. UOI & Anr. (W.P. No. 1325 of 2010), available at http://
www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1488702/.
72. Azadi Bachao Andolan, 263 ITR at 706.
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of a nexus with India. Revenue authorities have determined a tax liability of INR 120
billion.73 Vodafone's appeal to the Supreme Court is pending.
73. E.g., P.S. Patnaik, India Court Tells Authorities to Fix Vodafone Taxes, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2010-09-27/indian-supreme-court-tells-tax-officials-to-respond-to-vodafone-appeal.html.
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